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Recently, we have shown the advantages of two-way quantum communications in continuous
variable quantum cryptography. Thanks to this new approach, two honest users can achieve a non-
trivial security enhancement as long as the Gaussian interactions of an eavesdropper are independent
and identical. In this work, we consider asymmetric strategies where the Gaussian interactions can be
different and classically correlated. For several attacks of this kind, we prove that the enhancement
of security still holds when the two-way protocols are used in direct reconciliation.
INTRODUCTION TO CONTINUOUS VARIABLE
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
In recent years, quantum information has discovered
the non-trivial advantages offered by continuous variable
systems, i.e., quantum systems described by a set of ob-
servables, like position and momentum, having a contin-
uous spectrum of eigenvalues [1]. Accordingly, quantum
key distribution has been extended to this new framework
[2, 3, 4, 5] and cryptographic protocols based on coher-
ent states have been proven to be very powerful for their
experimental feasibility [6, 7]. In these quantum key dis-
tribution protocols, Alice prepares a coherent state |γ〉
whose amplitude γ = (Q + iP )/2 encodes two random
variables Q and P following two independent Gaussian
distributions (having zero mean and the same large vari-
ance). Then, Alice sends the state to Bob, who measures
it in order to retrieve the encoded information. Such a
measurement can be:
(i) A measurement of Q or P , randomly chosen by
Bob. Such a disjoint measurement is called homo-
dyne detection and, therefore, we call “homodyne”
(Hom) the corresponding protocol [4, 6].
(ii) A joint measurement of Q and P . This measurement
is called heterodyne detection and is equivalent to a
balanced beam splitter followed by two homodyne
detectors. We call “heterodyne” (Het) the corre-
sponding protocol [5, 7].
In both protocols, Alice and Bob finally share pairs of cor-
related continuous variables. From these variables they
can extract a secret binary key via slicing techniques of
the phase space [8]. This classical stage is called reconcil-
iation and can be direct if Bob estimates Alice’s original
variables or reverse if Alice estimates Bob’s outcomes [9].
Even if these protocols belong to the so-called prepare
and measure (PM) schemes, they can be equivalently
formulated in terms of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
schemes, where Alice and Bob extract a secret key from
the correlated outcomes of the measurements made upon
a shared EPR source. This source is realized by a two-
mode squeezed vacuum state whose correlation matrix is
equal to
V =
(
V I
√
V 2 − 1Z√
V 2 − 1Z V I
)
, (1)
where Z ≡ diag(1,−1), I the 2 × 2 identity matrix, and
V is a variance characterizing the source [10]. One can
easily show that heterodyning one mode of this EPR
source is equivalent to the remote preparation of a co-
herent state |γ〉 whose amplitude γ is randomly modu-
lated by a Gaussian of variance V − 1 (see Appendix).
The EPR formulation of the Hom protocol is depicted
in Fig. 1 where the attack of a potential eavesdropper,
Eve, is also shown. According to the standard eavesdrop-
ping scenario, we consider an individual Gaussian attack
which is based on the usage of an entangling cloner [6].
In this attack, each signal sent from Alice to Bob (mode
B) is mixed with a probe (mode E), via a beam splitter
of transmission T . This probe is part of an EPR source
with variance W which is in Eve’s hands. At the end of
the protocol, when Bob reveals the basis (Q or P ) chosen
for each run, Eve will consequently perform the appro-
priate homodyne measurements (Q or P ) on her output
modes E′ and E′′. From such measurements, Eve will
infer Alice’s variable (direct reconciliation) or Bob’s vari-
able (reverse reconciliation). An entangling cloner attack
can be therefore characterized by two parameters, trans-
mission T and varianceW , which can be arranged in the
unique quantity
Σ ≡W (1− T )T−1 , (2)
representing the variance of the Gaussian noise added
by the channel. These quantities are evaluated by Alice
and Bob by publishing part of their correlated continuous
variablesQB′ and Q+, or PB′ and P− (see Fig. 1). In this
way, they perform an error analysis of the channel, which
provides the correlation matrix V′ of their shared Gaus-
sian state ρAB′ and, therefore, their mutual information
IAB = I(QB′ , Q+) (see Appendix). Similarly, they can
2evaluate IAE and IBE , and therefore the two key-rates
IAB− IAE (direct reconciliation) and IAB− IBE (reverse
reconciliation). The security thresholds achieved for high
modulation (V → +∞) are equal to Σ = 1 for direct
reconciliation, and to Σ = T−1 > 1 for reverse reconcili-
ation. In particular, for direct reconciliation, the optimal
attack is given by an entangling cloner with W = 1, i.e.,
a beam splitter (lossy channel attack). In such a case,
the threshold simply corresponds to T = 1/2, i.e., 3 dB
of losses [4]. Similar results [5] hold for the Het protocol.
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FIG. 1: Individual entangling cloner attack against the Hom
protocol. (See text for explanation.) The dashed line displays
a black-box, with an EPR source and a heterodyne detector
inside, which Alice can use to prepare a randomly displaced
coherent state |γ〉 .
TWO-WAY PROTOCOLS
Even if the underlying physical principles are the same,
different protocols are able to exploit them with different
performances. In Ref. [11], we have shown that a security
enhancement can be achieved by resorting to a multiple
quantum communication (QC) between the trusted par-
ties. In this approach, a bosonic mode is transmitted
forward and backward between the two parties in order
to store and distribute the secret information. Here we
briefly review these protocols and then we study their
security by assuming attacks which are asymmetric be-
tween the forward and backward paths. As depicted in
Fig. 2, we may consider two different types of two-way
protocols:
(i) Two-way homodyne (Hom2) protocol. The Hom2
protocol extends theHom protocol to two-way QC.
In the Hom2 protocol, Bob has an EPR source
(with variance V ), of which he keeps a mode r
while he sends the other reference mode R to Al-
ice. Then, Alice randomly displaces this mode
in phase-space. This means that she applies a
displacement operator [10] D(γ) whose amplitude
γ = (Q+iP )/2 follows a Gaussian distribution with〈
Q2
〉
=
〈
P 2
〉
= V and 〈QP 〉 = 〈Q〉 = 〈P 〉 = 0.
The final mode B is then sent back to Bob. This
mode contains Alice’s signal γ, since its quadra-
tures are equal to QB = QR+Q and PB = PR+P .
In order to access this signal, Bob homodynes his
modes r and B by choosing to measure their po-
sition or momentum at random. For instance, he
can decide to measure positions Qr and QB, so that
he can construct an optimal estimator of QR (from
Qr) and, then, an estimator Q
(B) of Q = QB−QR.
Symmetrically, he can measure Pr and PB to infer
P . The basis chosen for each run of the protocol
will be classically communicated to Alice at the end
of protocol, when the two trusted parties will share
pairs of correlated continuous variables {Q,Q(B)}
and {P, P (B)}.
(ii) Two-way heterodyne (Het2) protocol. As for the one-
way protocols, Bob can perform a joint measure-
ment of Q and P . This is achieved in the Het2
protocol which extends the Het protocol to two-
way QC. Here, Bob heterodynes his modes r and
B, from whose results he infers the full signal (Q,P )
of Alice. Notice that this protocol does not need
any final basis revelation. Further, it can be fully
implemented with coherent states. In fact, by het-
erodyning mode r, Bob equivalently prepares a co-
herent state |Γ〉 = D(Γ) |0〉 which is sent to Alice.
This state is a reference state which contains the
reference random transformation Γ known to Bob.
By applying her random displacement D(γ), Alice
transforms this state into another coherent state
|Γ + γ〉 which is sent back to Bob via the mode B.
By subsequent heterodyne detection, Bob is able to
estimate the total amplitude Γ + γ and, therefore,
to infer γ from the knowledge of Γ.
As discussed in Ref. [11] the previous two-way protocols
must be modified into safer hybrid formulations, Hom1,2
and Het1,2, where two-way QC is randomly switched
with one-way QC. In the hybrid formulation of these
protocols, the previous two-way QC is called the “ON
configuration” and must be randomly switched with an
“OFF configuration”. In the OFF configuration, Alice
simply detects the reference mode R (via homodyne or
heterodyne) and sends a new reference mode R˜ back to
Bob [11]. In both the ON and OFF configurations, Al-
ice and Bob finally disclose part of the data in order to
perform tomography of the quantum channel. Thanks to
this information, Alice and Bob can reconstruct Eve’s at-
tack. In particular, they are able to understand if Eve is
exploiting quantum and/or classical correlations between
the forward and backward paths (two-mode attacks). If
this is not the case (one-mode attacks), they use the ON
instances to generate the secret key. Otherwise, they can
use the OFF instances [11].
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FIG. 2: Two-way quantum cryptography. Inset (i) shows
the Hom2 protocol, i.e., the ON configuration of the hybrid
protocol Hom1,2. Inset (ii) shows the Het2 protocol, i.e., the
ON configuration of the hybrid protocol Het1,2.
SECURITY AGAINST ASYMMETRIC
GAUSSIAN ATTACKS
Notice that in Ref. [11], the quantitative cryptoanal-
ysis is restricted to one-mode Gaussian attacks, where
independent and identical Gaussian interactions affect
the forward and backward channels of the two-way quan-
tum communication. Here, we study an extension of this
analysis by considering attacks where the Gaussian in-
teractions are independent but no longer identical. By
independent interactions we mean interactions which are
incoherent, i.e., void of quantum correlations. However,
since these interactions are generally different, they can
be classically correlated, i.e., specified by correlated pa-
rameters [12]. A general analysis of these “asymmetric
Gaussian attacks” is very difficult. For this reason, we
consider only specific classes which are constructed using
entangling cloners and/or lossy channels. Further, our
cryptoanalysis concerns direct reconciliation only. Un-
der these assumptions we are able to prove that the ON
configuration of the hybrid protocols (two-way QC) still
provides a security enhancement.
Let us study the security of the hybrid protocolHom1,2
against (individual) asymmetric Gaussian attacks which
are based on the combination of entangling cloners. Let
us assume that Alice and Bob generate the secret key
using the ON configuration of the protocol, i.e., the two-
way QC. If we label the forward and backward chan-
nels by i = 1, 2 respectively, then we must combine
two entangling cloners with free parameters T1,W1 and
T2,W2 (i.e., added noises Σ1 and Σ2). By homodyn-
ing their outputs in the correct basis, Eve constructs
an optimal estimator Q(E) [or P (E)] of Alice’s variable.
This enables her to eavesdrop the mutual information
IAE = (1/2) ln(V/VA|E), where the conditional variance
VA|E ≡ VQ|Q(E) = VP |P (E) quantifies Eve’s remaining un-
certainty on Alice’s variable. Similarly, Bob’s estimator
Q(B) [or P (B)] leaves him with a conditional variance
VA|B ≡ VQ|Q(B) = VP |P (B) . For Ti 6= 0, 1 and V → +∞,
one derives
VA|B =
T2(1− T1)W1 + (1 − T2)W2
T2
, (3)
VA|E =
T2(1− T1)W−12 + (1− T2)W−11
(1− T1)(1 − T2) . (4)
Let us consider the minimum of VA|BVA|E , so that Eve
minimizes her perturbation of the channel (VA|B) while
maximizing the acquired information (inverse of VA|E).
Such a product takes the minimum value VA|BVA|E = 4
for
W2 = 1 and T2 = [1 + (1− T1)W1]−1. (5)
The latter condition corresponds to considering an entan-
gling cloner with free parameters (T1,W1) on the forward
channel, followed by a beam splitter with a classically
correlated transmission T2 = f(T1,W1) on the backward
channel. In order to derive the security threshold we
must impose the condition IAB = IAE which is equiv-
alent to VA|B = VA|E . By using Eqs. (3), (4) and (5),
we get W1 = (1 − T1)−1 and T2 = 1/2. These parame-
ters characterize the curve of the threshold attacks which
have total noise equal to
Σ ≡ Σ1 +Σ2 = 1 + T−11 . (6)
It follows that the security threshold of Hom1,2 satisfies
Σ > 2, to be compared with the security threshold Σ = 1
of the corresponding one-way protocol Hom1. In other
words, when the communication channel is too noisy for
one-way protocols, it can still be used by two-way proto-
cols to generate a secret key.
In order to support further this “superadditivity”, we
also study the case of asymmetric lossy-channel attacks
where the two paths of QC are attacked by two beam
splitters with different (correlated) transmissions T1 and
T2. Once the correct basis is disclosed by Bob, Eve ho-
modynes their output ports E′1 and E
′
2 to infer the signal
(in the individual version of the attack). Since two beam
splitters are two entangling cloners with W1 = W2 = 1,
from Eqs. (3) and (4) we get
VA|B =
1− T1T2
T2
, (7)
4and
VA|E =
1− T1T2
(1− T1)(1− T2) . (8)
Then, from VA|B = VA|E we get the threshold curve for
this kind of attack, i.e.,
T2 = (1− T1)(1− T2) . (9)
The total transmission T ≡ T1T2 has a maximum equal
to 3− 2√2 on this curve. Such a value corresponds to a
threshold of about 7.65dB of losses, to be compared with
the 3dB limit of the one-way protocol.
More strongly, we prove that this threshold remains
the same even when we change the nature of the lossy-
channel attack from individual to collective. In the col-
lective attack, Eve keeps her output probes until the end
of the protocol, when she exploits all the classical infor-
mation exchanged by Alice and Bob to perform a final co-
herent measurement on all her probes. In such a case, the
key rate is bounded by IAB −χE where χE is the Holevo
information of the ensemble ρE =
∫
G(Q)ρE(Q)dQ (here
ρE(Q) is Eve’s conditional state, while G(Q) is a Gaus-
sian with variance
〈
Q2
〉
= V ). For Ti 6= 0, 1 and
V → +∞, one can prove (see Appendix) that
χE =
1
2
ln
[
V (1− T1)(1− T2)
1− T1T2
]
. (10)
In the same limit, Alice and Bob’s mutual information is
given by
IAB =
1
2
ln
(
V
VA|B
)
→ 1
2
ln
(
T2V
1− T1T2
)
. (11)
As a consequence, the threshold condition IAB = χE
gives the same curve of Eq. (9), so that the security
threshold remains 7.65dB.
Let us now study the security of the hybrid protocol
Het1,2 against (collective) asymmetric lossy-channel at-
tacks. Let us assume again that Alice and Bob use the
ON configuration to generate the secret key. For Ti 6= 0, 1
and V → +∞, one derives IAB = ln(T2V/2) while Eve’s
accessible information is bounded by
χE = ln
[
eV (1− T1)(1 − T2)
2(1− T1T2)
]
. (12)
Then, from the condition IAB = χE , one finds the curve
T2(1− T1T2) = e(1− T1)(1− T2) . (13)
On this curve the total transmission T ≡ T1T2 has a
maximum equal to e(e + 4)−1, corresponding to about
3.93dB. Such a value must be compared with the thresh-
old of 1.4dB found for the corresponding Het protocol
[13]. Notice that if we allow Bob to perform coherent
measurements (on all his states) in order to retrieve Al-
ice’s signal (Q,P ), then we can reach the same security
performances of the Hom1,2 protocol. In such a case,
in fact, Bob can asymptotically approach the accessible
information
χB = ln
[
eT2V
2(1− T1T2)
]
, (14)
for V → +∞ and Ti 6= 0, 1 (see Appendix). From the
threshold condition χB − χE = 0, we then get the same
curve of Eq. (9) and, therefore, the same security thresh-
old of 7.65dB as Hom1,2.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, multi-way quantum cryptography repre-
sents a new environment to develop and extend quantum
key distribution protocols. In this paper we have stud-
ied the security of two-way protocols against Gaussian
attacks which are asymmetric between the two paths of
the quantum communication. We have shown that, even
in the presence of these asymmetric strategies, the su-
peradditivity of the two-way quantum communication is
preserved in direct reconciliation. In particular, this is
true for an important class of asymmetric Gaussian at-
tacks, i.e., the asymmetric lossy-channel attacks. These
analyses represent further steps to assess the security of
two-way schemes in the context of continuous variable
quantum cryptography.
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APPENDIX
Estimators and remote state preparation
Consider the general scenario where Alice and Bob
share two modes A and B, whose quadratures ~ξ ≡
(QA, PA, QB, PB) satisfy the canonical commutation re-
lations [ξl, ξm] = 2iJlm, where
J =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
⊕
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (15)
Suppose that modes A and B are described by a bipartite
Gaussian state ρAB, with zero displacement d ≡ 〈~ξ〉 = 0
and correlation matrix (CM) V, with generic entries
Vlm ≡ 〈ξlξm + ξmξl〉/2. The CM V is a real and sym-
metric matrix that must satisfy the Heisenberg principle
V + iJ ≥ 0 , (16)
5taking the form
〈
Q2A
〉 〈
P 2A
〉 ≥ 1 for the diagonal ele-
ments. All the quantum and/or classical correlations
between the modes are described by the CM which we
assume to be completely known to the parties.
Then, suppose that Alice homodynes mode A and Bob
homodynes mode B, both of them projecting onto the
same quadrature, e.g., Q. Thanks to the shared correla-
tions, Alice is able to infer Bob’s outcome QB from the
outcome QA of her measurement [9]. In fact, from QA,
Alice can construct the optimal estimator Q
(A)
B ≡ κQA of
the variable QB, where κ ≡ 〈QAQB〉〈Q2A〉−1 is directly
computable from the CM. After her estimation, Bob’s
variable QB, with initial variance VQB ≡ 〈Q2B〉, will be
reduced to the conditional variable QB|A ≡ QB − Q(A)B
with conditional variance
VQB |QA ≡ 〈Q2B|A〉 =
〈
Q2B
〉−
〈
Q
(A)
B QB
〉2
〈
Q
(A)2
B
〉
=
〈
Q2B
〉− 〈QAQB〉2〈Q2A〉 . (17)
Thanks to Alice’s estimation, the Shannon entropy
H(QB) = (1/2) lnVQB of Bob’s variable has been
reduced to the conditional entropy H(QB|QA) =
(1/2) lnVQB |QA . Therefore, the mutual information of
Alice and Bob will be given by
I(QB, QA) = H(QB)−H(QB|QA) = 1
2
ln
VQB
VQB |QA
.
(18)
Now, if we do not consider Bob’s measurement, Alice’s
local measurement corresponds to a remote state prepa-
ration at Bob’s site. In fact, her measurement simply cor-
responds to a Gaussian quantum operation that projects
Bob’s mode onto a Gaussian state, centered at the point
{Q(A)B , 0} of phase-space, and with uncertainties equal
to VQB |QA of Eq. (17) and VPB |PA ≥ V −1QB |QA . More
generally, Alice can remotely prepare a Gaussian state
by making a joint measurement of her quadratures QA
and PA. For instance, she can perform a heterodyne de-
tection by inserting her mode A into a balanced beam
splitter and, then, detecting the quadratures Q+ and P−
of the output modes ‘±’ (see Fig. 1). From the out-
comes (Q+, P−), Alice can construct two optimal esti-
mators Q
(+)
B = ξ+Q+ and P
(−)
B = ξ−P−, so that Bob’s
variables QB and PB are reduced to the conditional ones
QB|+ ≡ QB − Q(+)B and PB|− ≡ PB − P (−)B , with con-
ditional variances VQB |Q+ and VPB |P− [computable from
the CMs of ρ+B and ρ−B according to Eq. (17)]. In
other words, Alice remotely prepares a Gaussian state
centered at {Q(+)B , P (−)B } with uncertainties VQB |Q+ and
VPB |P− In particular, if the shared Gaussian state ρAB
is an EPR source with variance V [see Eq. (1)] then
VQB |Q+ = VPB |P− = 1 and, therefore, Alice prepares a
coherent state |γ〉 with amplitude γ = [Q(+)B + iP (−)B ]/2.
Due to the probabilistic behavior of the measurement,
the amplitude γ represents a complex random variable
over many instances of the process. Such a variable fol-
lows a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and sec-
ond moments given by 〈Q(+)2B 〉 = 〈P (−)2B 〉 = V − 1 and
〈Q(+)B P (−)B 〉 = 0. Therefore, the physical scheme where
Alice and Bob share an EPR source with variance V and
Alice heterodynes her mode is equivalent to a black-box
where Alice prepares a coherent state whose amplitude
is modulated by a Gaussian distribution with variance
V − 1. In this sense, prepare and measure schemes using
coherent states are equivalent to EPR schemes.
Computation of the relevant entropies
Consider the case of a collective and asymmetric lossy-
channel attack against the protocol Hom1,2 in the ON
configuration. This means that Eve exploits two beam-
splitters of (correlated) transmissions T1, T2 and per-
forms a final coherent measurement on all her probes.
Eve’s output modes E′1, E
′
2 are described by a state
ρE(Q) which is conditioned to Alice’s encoding Q. On
average, Eve gets an ensemble ρE =
∫
G(Q)ρE(Q)dQ,
where G(Q) is a Gaussian distribution with variance〈
Q2
〉
= V . The Holevo information of Eve is then equal
to χE = SE − SE|A, where SE and SE|A are the Von
Neumann entropies of ρE and ρE(Q) (computable from
the CMs VE and VE|A of the corresponding Gaussian
states). One can prove that VE = V12 ⊕ I⊕ I, where
V12 =
(
µ1I θI
θI µ2I+Ω (V, V )
)
, (19)
with
µ1 ≡ T1 + (1− T1)V , (20)
µ2 ≡ 1 + T1(1 − T2)(V − 1) , (21)
θ ≡
√
T1(1 − T1)(1 − T2) (V − 1) , (22)
and
Ω(VQ, VP ) ≡ (1− T2)
(
VQ 0
0 VP
)
. (23)
The Von Neumann entropy SE of the Gaussian state ρE
can be computed from the symplectic eigenvalues [14] νk
of the CM VE according to the formula
SE =
4∑
k=1
g(νk) , (24)
where
g(x) ≡
(
x+ 1
2
)
ln
(
x+ 1
2
)
−
(
x− 1
2
)
ln
(
x− 1
2
)
.
(25)
6Note that, for x → +∞, the latter function adopts the
asymptotic expression [11, 13]
g(x)→ 1 + ln(x/2) +O(x−1) . (26)
Since VE = V12 ⊕ I⊕ I, we have that
ν1 = ν− , ν2 = ν+ , ν3 = ν4 = 1 , (27)
where ν± are the symplectic eigenvalues of V12. For non
trivial attacks (Ti 6= 0, 1) and high modulation (V →
+∞), the symplectic eigenvalues ν± become proportional
to V . In particular, one has
ν+ν− =
√
detV12 → (1 − T1)(1− T2)V 2 . (28)
In the same limit, the entropy becomes
SE = g(ν−) + g(ν+)→ 2 + ln
[
1
4
lim
V→+∞
√
detV12
]
= 2 + ln
[
V 2
4
(1− T1)(1− T2)
]
. (29)
The conditional entropy SE|A can be computed from
the symplectic eigenvalues of the matrix VE|A. It is easy
to verify that VE|A can be derived from VE by substi-
tuting Ω(0, V ) for Ω(V, V ) in Eq. (19). Then, repeating
the previous steps, one finds
SE|A → 2+
1
2
ln
[
V 3
16
(1− T1)(1− T2)(1− T1T2)
]
, (30)
so that χE is equal to Eq. (10).
Consider now a collective and asymmetric lossy-
channel attack against the protocol Het1,2 in the ON
configuration. Eve’s entropy SE is the same as before,
while the partial entropy SE|A is now conditioned to both
of Alice’s variables Q and P . This entropy can be derived
from the conditional CM VE|A, which is computed from
VE by substituting Ω(0, 0) for Ω(V, V ) in Eq. (19). For
Ti 6= 0, 1 and taking V → +∞, one finds
SE|A → 1 + ln
[
V
2
(1− T1T2)
]
, (31)
so that the Holevo information χE is equal to Eq. (12).
Now, let us allow Bob to perform a coherent measure-
ment on all his states, in order to retrieve the full signal
γ = (Q + iP )/2 encoded by Alice. Bob’s modes r and
B′ are described by a state ρB(γ) which is conditioned
to Alice’s encoding γ. On average, Bob gets an ensemble
ρB =
∫
G(γ)ρB(γ)d
2γ, where G(γ) is a Gaussian distri-
bution with
〈
Q2
〉
=
〈
P 2
〉
= V and 〈QP 〉 = 0. The Bob’s
Holevo information is then equal to χB = SB − SB|A,
where the two Von Neumann entropies SB and SB|A are
computable from the CMs of ρB and ρB(γ) exactly as
before. One can verify that ρB has the CM
VB =
(
V I ϕZ
ϕZ [ς +Ω(V )]I
)
, (32)
where
ϕ ≡
√
T1T2(V 2 − 1) , (33)
ς ≡ 1 + T1T2(V − 1) , (34)
and
Ω(V ) = T2V . (35)
For Ti 6= 0, 1 and V → +∞, the symplectic eigenvalues of
VB become proportional to V and the entropy becomes
SB → 2 + ln
[
1
4
lim
V→+∞
√
detVB
]
= 2 + ln
(
T2V
2
4
)
.
(36)
Then, the CM VB|A of ρB(γ) can be computed by sub-
stituting Ω(0) for Ω(V ) in Eq. (32). In the usual limit,
we have ν− = 1 and ν+ → V (1− T1T2), so that
SB|A = g(ν+)→ 1 + ln
[
V
2
(1− T1T2)
]
. (37)
From Eqs. (36) and (37), one easily gets Eq. (14) for
Bob’s Holevo information.
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